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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN CARTER, a Taxpayer for 
himself and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY SERVICE AREA 
NO. ONE, a body corporate and politic, 
JAMES G. WILLIAMS, PAULK. NEIL-
SON, EVAN C. NIELSEN, ALLEN C. 
REYNOLDS and ARLO MESSINGER, 
as Trustees of said Service Area, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for Declaratory Judgment seeking 
a declaration that the Defendant Service Area is uncon-
stitutional and that the bond election held by said service 
area is invalid. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge of the District 
Court for Beaver County, sitting without a jury, entered 
judgment declaring said Service Area to be constitutional 
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and the said bond election to be valid, from which Judg-
ment Plaintiff appeals: 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks affirmance of the Judgment entered 
by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This action arises out of Title 17, Chapter 29, U.C.A., 
1953 as passed in 1957 and as amended in 1959, and 1961, 
which provides for the creation of County Service Areas. 
The Defendant Service Area was created in 1959 pursuant 
to the above statute by a resolution of the Countty Com-
missioners of Beaver County. The Defendant trustees are 
the duly appointed trustees of said Service Area. 
Since the creation of Beaver County Service Area No. 
One, taxes have been assessed and collected, a site for a 
hospital has been chosen, purchased and approved. The 
Service Area has expended various funds of money for 
architect's fees, attorney's fees and other miscellaneous ex-
penditures in addition to the purchase of the site. Funds 
have been applied for under the Hill-Burton Act and 
monies have been committed to the Defendant Service 
Area for the building of a hospital in the approximate 
amount of $115,000.00, with the stipulation that if the 
Service Area has not raised their share of the funds and 
does not have the contract for the construction of the hos-
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pital let by June 30, 1964 then said commitment will 
terminate. 
The Defendants have been negotiating with Housing 
and Home Finance Agency, a federal agency, and other 
financing institutions, all of whom have refused to pur-
chase the Defendant Service Area's bonds because of the 
possible unconstitutionality of the County Service Area 
Act. 
The Plaintiff, a taxpayer within the Defendant Serv-
ice Area brought an action in this case for Declaratory 
Judgment alleging that the provisions of the County Serv-
ice Area Act (Title 17, Chapter 29, U.C.A., 1953) are 
unconstitutional in the following respects: 
1. That said act violates Article VI, Section 29 of 
the Utah Constitution in that it provides for the delega-
tion of power to a "special commission" to perform or in-
terfere with municipal functions. 
2. That 17-29-21, U.C.A., 1953 violates Article XIV 
Sections 3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution in that it per-
mits the Service Area to exceed the debt limitation found 
in the above article and sections. 
3. That the Act violates Article XIII, Section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution in that it permits the legislature to 
impose a tax for purposes of a municipal corporation. 
The Plaintiff also contended that the Defendants had 
not complied with the law with respect to the holding of 
a bond election. 
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The Defendants denied the above allegations and al-
leged in substance the arguments set forth hereim 
The evidence produced at the trial of the matter 
showed that there was an urgent need for hospital serv-
ices in the area. 
After taking the matter under advisement, the Lower 
Court entered its Memorandum Decision and subsequently 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
in favor of the Defendants. From this Judgment the Plain-
tiff appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COUNTY SERVICE AREAS, IMPROVEMENT DIS-
TRICTS, AND WATER AND SEWER DISTRICTS AS 
SUCH ARE SEPARATE ENTITIES OF GOVERNMENT, 
AND ARE QUASI MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND 
NOT SPECIAL COMMISSIONS, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS, OR ASSOCIATIONS, AS CONTEMPLATED BY 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29, UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
This issue has been decided and there are numerous 
decisions by the Utah Supreme Court, construing Title 
17, Chapter 6, U.C.A., 1953 (Water anld sewer districts) and 
Title 73, Chapter 8, U.C.A., 1953 (Metropolitan Water 
District Act), which are in all material respects identical to 
Title 17, Chapter 29, U.C.A., 1953, which provides for the 
creation of County Service Areas. 
The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out in a land-
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mark decision that numerous types of service districts 
have been held constitutional. Lehi City vs. Meiling, 87 
Utah 237, 48 P.2d 5·30, (1935). The court specifically re-
ferred to the following types of districts: Irrigation Dis-
tricts, Flood Control Districts, Reclamation Districts, Util-
ity Districts, Sanitary Districts, Tunnel Districts, Health 
Districts, Water Improvement Districts, Highway Dis-
tricts, Port Districts, Bridge Districts, Mosquito Abate-
ment Districts and Sewer Districts. 
The Lehi case involved the creation of a Metropolitan 
Water District governed by a board of directors, appointed 
by the governing authorities of the participating munici-
pal corporations, for the purpose of supplying water to 
the persons residing within the district. The court held 
that the statute did not violate the pr01visions of Article 
VI, Chapter 29 in the foll~wing language (P. 535): 
"This contention cannot be sustained for the rea-
son that the board of directors to whom the man-
agement and control of the district has been en-
trusted, and which is to exercise the powers and 
perform the functions of the public agency thus 
created, does not come within the designation 
'special commission, private corporation or associ-
ation' to which inhibitions of this section apply." 
The court further stated on page 541: 
"A Metropolitan Water District is not a "municip-
al corporation" within contemplation of the consti-
tution, but it is a public agency or entity created 
for beneficial and necessary public purposes. Its 
corporate structure is substantially the same as 
that of the Metropolitan Water District of Cali-
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fornia and other agencies of that state which have 
been held valid as public and quasi municipal cor-
porations or districts. Wheatly vs. Superior Court 
in and for Napa County, 207 Cal. 722, 279 P. 989. 
"The characterization 'quasi municipal' we 
think accurate, the water district is not a true 
municipal corporation having powers of local gov-
ernment, but is an agency of the state vested with 
some of the powers and attributes of a municipal 
ity; hence, it is not a municipal corporation but is 
quasi municipal." 
In another Utah case the same issue was raised as to 
Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution and was 
disposed of by the court.Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 119 
Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950). This case involved the cre-
ation of a water and sewer district under Title 17, Chapter 
6, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. The District, comprising on1ly 
a small portion of Salt Lake County, was initiated by the 
County Commissioners for the purpose of supplying water 
services to the residents of the district. The court held in 
that case with respect to the same point as follows (p. 130): 
". . . once the District is actually organized the 
county has no further connection with the District 
except the ministerial one of levying any taxes cer-
tified to it by the Board of Trustees, a duty of the 
county which is similar to that performed by it for 
Boards of Education under the provisions of Section 
75-12-10, U.C.A. 1943. Once the District is formed 
the Board of Trustees have full control and super-
vision of the property and the conduct of affairs of 
the District. The District must have its own seal and 
its Board of Trustees may sue and be sued. Also 
the taxes which are certified by the Board to the 
county commissioners can be levied only on proper-
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ty within the District. If a District were merely an 
arm of the county then the general taxes levied 
whether used for benefits inuring to the District 
or not should be levied against all residents of the 
county rather than on those only within the District, 
just as they are for other county functions. It being 
the duty of this court where possible to uphold the 
validity of an act rather than declare it unconstitu-
tional see Lehi City v. Meiling, City Recorder, supra, 
and Patterick v. Carbon Water Convervancy Dis-
trict, supra, we are of the opinion that an Improve-
ment District is a separate arm of the government 
and not a mere adjunct of a county performing 
county functions." 
The case of Freeman v. Stewart, et al, 2 Utah 2d 319, 
273, P.2d 174, (1954) involved the creation under Title 17, 
Chapter 6, U.C.A., 1953 of an Improvement District known 
as the Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary District. The creation 
of the District was initiated by the Board of County Com-
missioners of Salt Lake County for the purpose of con-
structing and operating a sewer system in a small portion 
of the unincorporated area in Salt Lake County. In that 
case, the court, at page 176, said: 
"These contentions have been dealt with and given 
extensive consideration by this court in a number 
of cases in which we have held that improvement 
districts are a separate entity of government and 
not 'municipal corporations' as contemplated by 
the constitution. Therefore, the above constitutional 
provisions do not apply to the sanitary district in-
volved in the instant case." 
See also the following cases: Patterick v. Carbon Wa-
ter Conservancy District, et al, 106 Utah 55, 145 P.2d 504 
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(1944); Provo City v. Evans, 87 Utah 292, P.2d 555 (1935); 
City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653, 269 P.630 
(1928). 
The recent case of Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 
Utah 2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962) can be distinquished from 
the instant case in that the court specifically held in that 
case there was no necessity for a sports arena while in this 
case there exists an urgent and compelling need for hos-
pital services in an area of the state where adequate hos-
pital facilities are not available to provide the barest of 
any type of hospital care to insure health and safety of 
residents and which hospital facilities cannot be accomp-
lished otherwise than by a service area. In the Backman 
case, it was indicated that there were various other meth-
ods of building the Civic Center. That case is also distin-
guished by the fact that the statute providing for the Civic 
Center was deemed to be a special law apt>lying only to 
the Salt Lake Metropolitan area. 
It is also submitted that health being of such import-
ance so as to make it of state concern, the providing of a 
hospital cannot be said to be a purely municipal function. 
The constitution of the State of California contains the 
same prohibition (see Article XI, Section 13) against dele-
gation of pow~r as is contained in Article VI, Section 29 
of our Constitution. A situation very similar to the instant 
case was presented to the California Court in Paso Robles 
War Memorial Hospital District v. Negley, California, 173 
P.2d 813 (1946). 
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In that case a hospital district was created under the 
Local Hospital District Law and a bond election was held 
in which 2/3 of the residents of the district voted for the 
bonding. The secretary of the district refused to attest the 
bonds, claiming the above law to be unconstitutional. The 
California Court said in1 this regard (p. 814): 
"No provision of the Constitution of the State of 
California or of the Constitution of the United 
States prohibits the Legislature from authorizing a 
public corporation to build and operate a hospital 
as a business, (cases cited)." 
The Court held that a district created under the law 
is a separate entity an1d may or may not include an 
entire county. It was pointed out that the larger cities 
of California had hospital facilities but that many rural 
areas were without them. The Court further held that 
this "lack of hospitals is a threat to health and safety." 
Many other states have provided for and allowed set-
ting up hospital districts to provide hospital services to 
the residents of the district, not necessarily coterminous 
with the boundaries of any city or county. See Ecorse v. 
Peoples Community Hospital Authority, 336 Mich. 490, 
58 N.W. 2d 159 (1953); Royal v. Cain, 410 Ill. 39, 101 N.E. 
2d 74 (1951); McLure v. McElroy, 211 S.C. 106, 44 S.E. 2d 
101 (1947); Hickman v. Lunden, Idaho, 300 P.2d 818 
(1956), Baldwin v. McFadden, So. Car., 109 S.E. 579 
(1959); State v. Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital 
District, Fla. 90 So. 2d 809 (1956). 
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POINT II 
THE CREATION OF THE DEFENDANT SERVICE 
AREA UNDER TITLE 17, CHAPTER 29, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF AR-
TICLE. XIII, SEC. 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
SINCE SUCH A SERVICE AREA IS NOT A COUNTY, 
CITY, TOWN OR OTHEH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
AS CONTEMPLATED BY THIS PROVISION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION. FUTHERMORE ALL TAXES PRO-
VIDED FOR IN THE COUNTY SERVICE AREA ACT 
ARE IMPOSED BY THE SERVICE AREA AND THE 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AND NOT BY THE LEGIS-
LATURE AS CONTEMPLATED BY THIS PROVISION 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In Freeman v. Stewart, supra, the Plaintiff claimed 
that the statutes authorizing the creation and maintenance 
of the Sanitary District violated the interdiction against the 
legislative imposition to taxes for the purpose of a munici-
pal corporation under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah 
Constitutio~ and the court disposed of this contention by 
holding that the Improvement Districts are separate enti-
ties of government and not "municipal corporations" as 
contemplated by the constitution, and therefore the con-
stitutional provisions referred to do not apply. The court in 
that decision referred to a number of cases in which it said 
it had given "extensive consideration" to this problem. 
Notwiths,tanding the fact that this constitutional pro-
vision does not apply, it should be noted that with respect 
to Title 17, Chapter 29, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, a tax 
levy is made by the Board of Trustees of the Service Area 
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and the County Commissioners and not the legislature. 
The imposition of taxes is subject to several safeguards 
in that said taxes are determined and imposed locally and 
not by the legislature. See also Lehi City v. Meiling, supra. 
POINT III 
SINCE IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS, COUNTY 
SERVICE AREAS AND WATER AND SEWER DIS-
TRICTS AS SUCH ARE SEPARATE ENTITIES OF 
GOVERNMENT AND ARE QUASI MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS AND NOT COUNTIES, CITIES, TOWNS 
OR VILLAGES, SUB-DIVISIONS THEREOF NOR OTH-
ER MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AS CONTEMPLAT-
ED BY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XIV, SECTIONS 
3 AND 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, SAID PRO-
VISIONS ARE NOT VIOLATED BY TITLE 17, CHAP-
TER 29, U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED. 
In the Tygesen v. Magna Water Company case, supra, 
the Plaintiff contended that the act was unconstitutional 
because it authorized counties to exceed their debt limita-
tions. The court said on page 135: 
"Since a district is not a county but a separate arm 
of the government distinct from counties or muni-
cipalities, the constitutional provisions as to coun-
ties do not apply." 
In the Lehi City case, supra, the act involved provided 
that the district was permitted to become indebted in a 
sum not exceeding ten per cent of the value of the taxable 
property of the district. The Plaintiff contended that this 
was a violation of Sections 3 and 4 of Article XIV of the 
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Utah Constitution. After a discussion of the meaning of the 
phrase in Section 3 "or sub-divisions thereof" the court 
held on page 540 as follows: 
"we are satisfied the Metropolitan Water District 
is not a sub-division of either a city, town, or coun-
ty within the meaning of the word sub-division as 
used in the constitution." 
In the court's consideration of Article XIV, Section 
4 it was further held that since the district was not a mu-
nicipal corporation it was not subject to the four per cent 
debt limitation imposed by the Constitution on municipal 
corporations in this. provision of the constitution. 
In Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 
106 Utah 55, 145 P.2d 503 (1944) the Plaintiff raised the 
same contention, that these provisions of the Utah Consti-
tution were violated and the court held on pages 511 and 
512 that such contentions: 
"have no merits as these constitutional inhibitions 
apply only to cities, towns, and villages and sub-
divisions of said cities, towns, or villages and do 
not apply to water conservancy districts which are 
not municipalities within the contemplation of that 
term as used in the constitution. A water conserv-
ancy district is an arm of the government separate 
and distinct from any municipality, with powers 
and rules of its own, and the mere fact that its ter-
ritorial boundaries may encompass the territorial 
boundaries of a municipality does not make it a 
part of the city. Its powers and objectives are dis-
tinct and separate." 
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POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THE 
DEFENDANT SERVICE AREA IS SUBJECT TO THE 
PROHIBITIONS OF ARTICLE XIV, SECTIONS 3 AND 
4, THIS FACT WOULD NOT MAKE THE ACT VOID 
BUT RATHER THE LIMITATION OF DEBT WOULD 
BE THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIT INSTEAD OF THE 
STATUTORY LIMIT OF TWELVE PER CENT, SINCE 
THE ACT CONTAINS A SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. 
In the Lehi City case, supra, the court held the Metro-
politan Water District was not a municipal corporation 
rnd therefore did not come within the purview of the con-
titutional debt limit and the Court further said, on page 
540: 
"If the district be a municipal corporation, it would 
not necessarily follow that the act is void but the 
limitation of debt would be the constitutional limit 
of four per cent intstead of the statutory ten per 
cent." 
Chapter 34, Section 3 of the Utah Session Laws for 
1961 contains the following separability clause: 
"If any provision of this act, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstance is held 
invalid, the remainder of this act shall not be af-
fee ted thereby." 
In view of these provisions, even if 17-29-21, U.C.A., 
1953 is deemed to violate the constitutional debt limita-
tion, the defendant Service Area would not be in violation 
of the constitutional debt limitation as shown by the evi-
dence adduced in the Lower Court. 
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POINT V 
THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS REQUIRES 
THAT THE COURT DECLARE TITLE 17, CHAPTER 29, 
U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED, TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Two acts, the Metropolitan Water District Act (Title 
73, Chapter 8, U.C.A., 1953) and the Sewer and Water Dis-
trict Act (Title 17, Chapter 6, U.C.A., 1953) are very sim-
ilar to the act in question here. For example, the districts 
under all three acts are initiated by local governing boards 
and the boundaries of said districts may include part or all 
of a county. The districts all constitute separate entities, 
governed by independent boards, which are generally ap-
pointed by local authorities and which have similar pow-
ers and duties. These boards all have the power to tax. 
All three acts authorize indebtedness in excess of consti-
tutional debt limits imposed on municipal corporations. 
The purpose of the Districts created under the three acts 
are all very similar in that they are designed and created 
for necessary and beneficial public purposes. 
It is again emphasized that the constitutionality of two 
of the above acts has long since been decided. The Metro-
politan Water District Act was held constitutional in the 
cases of Lehi v. Meiling, supra, and Provo City v Evans, 
supra. The Water and Sewer District Act was held consti-
tutional in the cases of Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., su-
pra, and Freeman v. Stewart, supra. 
In the Freeman Case the Plaintiff contended that 
Title 17, Chapter 29, U.C.A., 1953, violated the constitu-
tional provisions discussed in this brief. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
The court held that these contentions had been given 
extensive consideration in other cases and further, on 
page 176, had this to say: 
"We are asked to review the correctness of those 
decisions. Even if we were inclined to do so, the 
doctrine of Stare Decisis now stays in our hands. It 
is one of the important principles inJ the structure 
of our law. In a well ordered society, it is important 
that people know what their legal rights are, not 
only under constitutions and legislative enactments 
but also as defined by judicial precedent, and hav-
ing conducted their affairs in reliance thereon, 
ought not to have their rights swept away by ju-
dicial decree. And this is especially so where rights 
of property are involved. The law laid down in 
these decisions has been acted upon and numerous 
improvement districts created and financed, so that 
it must be said to be a rule of property with respect 
to which the doctrine should apply with all its 
force***. This universally accepted idea is illus-
trated by the expression of the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico speaking in respect to an irrigation 
project: 'In the nineteen years since that decision 
it may be assumed that many thousands of acres*** 
have been sold to purchasers who relied on that 
decision***. Whether it stated the correct rule of 
law***, it is now a rule of property that we will 
not disturb'." 
In reliance upon these pronouncementts by our Su-
preme Court numerous Service Areas, Improve;rnent Dis-
tricts, and Sewer and Water Districts have been created 
involving millions of dollars in bonded indebtedness 
throughout the state. As indicated in the Freeman case, 
the doctrine of stare decisis should apply "with all its 
force." 
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In the instant case, the Beaver County Service Area 
No. One has been duly created and has purchased property 
for the purpose of constructing a hospital thereon. There 
being no reason to distinguish this Service Area Act from 
the other acts above enumerated, the court should be re-
quired by the doctrine of stare decisis to hold the Service 
Area Act constitutional in all respects. 
THERE IS A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITLE 17, CHAPTER 29, 
U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED. 
There is a well recognized presumption that legislative 
enactments are constitutional. In discussing this presump-
tion the court in the Lehi case, supra, said (p. 535): 
"In approaching the subject, we have in mind the 
rule that when an act of the legislature is attacked 
on grounds of unlconstitutionality the question pre-
sented is not whether it is possible to condemn the 
act, but whether it is possible to uphold it. The pre-
sumption is always in favor of validity, and legis-
lative enactment must be sustained unless clearly 
in violation of fundamental law." 
See also Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy Dis-
trict) supra, and Tygesen v. Magna Water Company) supra. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated and particularly due to 
the prior pronouncements by the Supreme Court as dis-
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cussed herein1, we submit that the County Service Area 
Act, Title 17, Chapter 29, U.C.A., 1953, as amended is con-
stitutional in all respects and does not violate the pro-
visions of Article VI, Section 29; Article XIII, Section 5; 
and Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution 
and we therefore urge that the Court affirm the lower 
court decision which declared said act to be constitutional, 
and which declared the bond election held in the instant 
case to be conducted in accordance with the law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HENRIKSEN & MURDOCK 
C. R. HENRIKSEN 
S. REED MURDOCK 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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